In this AFP entry, we show how to specify game-based cryptographic security notions and formally prove secure several cryptographic constructions from the literature using the CryptHOL framework. Among others, we formalise the notions of a random oracle, a pseudo-random function, an unpredictable function, and of encryption schemes that are indistinguishable under chosen plaintext and/or ciphertext attacks. We prove the random-permutation/random-function switching lemma, security of the Elgamal and hashed Elgamal public-key encryption scheme and correctness and security of several constructions with pseudo-random functions. Our proofs follow the game-hopping style advocated by Shoup and Bellare and Rogaway, from which most of the examples have been taken. We generalise some of their results such that they can be reused in other proofs. Thanks to CryptHOL’s integration with Isabelle’s parametricity infrastructure, many simple hops are easily justified using the theory of representation independence.
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